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A B S T R A C T
Salmon production, and aquaculture in general, entails certain environmental risks that must be managed and
controlled. In Norway, as in other aquaculture-producing countries, governments seek means of improving the
industry and encouraging sustainable conduct. In Norwegian aquaculture regulation, the salmon louse has be-
come an important indicator and regulatory instrument – a governmental technology. The louse is a proxy for
the environmental impact of the industry and as a governmental technology, it is used to regulate and incite
behavior. In this paper, we draw on results from both interviews and an analysis of responses to a consultation
round for a governmental White Paper proposing new means for regulating the growth of the aquaculture
industry. Based on these results, we investigate the becoming of the salmon louse as a regulatory instrument, and
how this is perceived among relevant stakeholders. The political signiﬁcance of the salmon louse serves to
illuminate how a governmental technology is created to instill control from a distance. The history of how the
salmon louse has become a governable object additionally elucidates disagreements and uncertainties sur-
rounding modern salmon farming and demonstrates that the creation of governmental technologies persists in
the face of resistance.
1. Introduction
During the past 50 years aquaculture has gone from being a rela-
tively insigniﬁcant food source to surpassing that of wild ﬁsheries (FAO
in Garlock et al., 2019). The aquaculture industry currently produces 47
% of the total global ﬁsh production (FAO, 2018). Production of
Atlantic salmon is in comparison to the production of carp and tilapia of
less volume. However, Norway, being the largest producer of farmed
salmon, still rates among the top ten aquaculture producing nations
(Garlock et al., 2019). Salmon production in Norway also had the
fastest growth rate (7 %) among developed countries in the last decade
and the 16th fastest growth rate among the major producing nations
(Garlock et al., 2019). While beneﬁcial physical conditions, such as a
lengthy coastline providing sheltered conditions, biological, and tech-
nological innovations, can account for much of the success of the
salmon industry in Norway, good governance structures and regulatory
frameworks are also an important reason (Osmundsen et al., 2017). The
stability and quality of the regulatory environment for the aquaculture
industry has in former research been seen as linked to technology
adoption (Kumar et al., 2018), and possibilities for expansion (Young
et al., 2019). The shape and form of public regulation has a strong in-
ﬂuence on how the aquaculture industry develops. It is therefore im-
portant to increase our understanding of how diﬀerent regulatory sys-
tems and instruments perform.
In Norwegian aquaculture regulation, the salmon louse,
Lepeophteirus salmonis, has since 20091 been central to the public reg-
ulation of salmon aquaculture in Norway. Increased attention to the
salmon louse is related to the growth of the industry, alongside greater
awareness of how lice infection may have negative consequences for
wild salmon. During the same period, there has been increased pressure
for greater control with the industry (Olsen and Osmundsen, 2017). In
public debate, it is foremost the environmental impact of salmon pro-
duction that is seen as a risk (Olsen and Osmundsen, 2017; Osmundsen
and Olsen, 2017), and this is where the impact of salmon lice on wild
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salmonids takes centre stage2 (Misund, 2019). Salmon lice are deemed
one of the biggest threats to wild salmon in Norway (Thorstad and
Finstad, 2018). Indeed, this tiny louse has the most signiﬁcant eco-
nomic impact of any parasite in salmon aquaculture (Costello, 2006),
instigating multi-million dollar commercial losses (Aboloﬁa et al.,
2017). The requirement for frequent lice counts is perceived as de-
manding within the industry owing to resources and costs(Thorvaldsen
et al., 2019). Nevertheless, lice counts are very important since reported
lice numbers may have severe implications for day-to-day production,
as well as for companies' production licences. Emphasis on lice is de-
manding for the ﬁsh itself and for the staﬀ, as strict delousing regula-
tions requires more operations on the farm, causing reduced welfare for
the ﬁsh, and a higher risk for unsafe operations that may lead to both
escapes and possible harm to personnel (Holen et al., 2018).
The problem is considered so severe that salmon louse as an in-
dicator now permeates most of Norwegian public regulations con-
cerning aquaculture. The political signiﬁcance of this tiny louse is thus
impressive, persisting in the face of heavy resistance and disagreement
among public and private stakeholders alike. In this paper, the devel-
opment of how the salmon louse becomes a regulatory instrument – a
governmental technology- to control the aquaculture industry is dis-
cussed. In addition to constituting a parasite that threatens the salmon
industry, public authorities view the louse as an objective and reliable
indicator regarding human impacts on nature. Regulation of sustain-
ability often relies on measurable parameters, and the salmon louse is
easily counted and communicated. Indeed, a number serves as a point
of reference: something that is transferable and easy to compare, a
potential yardstick holding industrial actors accountable. However, as
the empirical data for this paper demonstrates, in order to become a
governmental technology, the salmon louse must be transformed and
deﬁned in ways that both simpliﬁes and reduces the uncertainty re-
garding its causes and consequences. This, in turn has implications for
the salmon industry as well as for legitimising public regulation and
control of the aquaculture industry.
Drawing on neo-Foucauldian and constructivist perspectives, this
article explores disagreement and resistance towards establishing the
salmon louse as a governmental technology in Norwegian aquaculture,
and discusses the possible implications of such a process.
1.1. Theoretical background
Constructionist perspectives of risk, which highlight historic, social
and cultural contexts, are useful for understanding why the salmon
louse has become such an important representative of sustainability in
the Norwegian aquaculture industry. The types of risk subjected to
public regulation have changed over time. To illustrate this point, Beck
(1992) uses the term risk society to describe a global society where the
risks associated with modernisation, created by humans through sci-
ence and technology, are placed in focus. In the risk society, environ-
mental risks stand out. Accordingly, salmon lice and farmed salmon are
perceived as anthropogenic threats to wild salmon. In environmental
discourse, the louse is not merely an indicator, but becomes a symbol of
the potentially dangerous and unsustainable aspects of aquaculture.
Moreover, given that nature is not directly accessible, it must be re-
presented through speciﬁc governable objects. These objects are con-
structed through symbolic representations of components and processes
in an ecosystem (Johnsen et al., 2014). Thus, although some outcomes
can be measured and monitored directly, indicators are employed to
ascertain the condition of something through measuring something else
that is easier to measure (Amundsen and Osmundsen, 2018; Kongsvik
et al., 2010; Osmundsen et al., 2019). The louse represents the
environmental consequences of aquaculture and serves to create spe-
ciﬁc intervention mechanisms for governance because it can be mea-
sured, quantiﬁed, and modelled (Hersoug, 2015). Indeed, it is an in-
dicator that serves as a governmental technology.
Risk management via institutions is closely linked to accountability,
responsibility, and expectations to reduce the risks in question (Power,
2007). Organisations must act in ways that fulﬁl these expectations by
demonstrating accountability (Johnsen et al., 2014). Governmentality,
as Foucault (1991) deﬁned it, is about understanding how to enable 'the
conduct to conduct'. That is, how does government enable control at a
distance without applying the use of direct or immediate force? Tech-
nologies of government, as Rose and Miller (1992) argue, tie together
the responsibility of individuals and their freedom to pursue a pre-
scribed and standardised target. The governmentality framework pro-
vides a set of characteristics that allows us to understand how such
technologies or objects are established, as well as their implications for
instilling control and power (Dean, 2010; Miller and Rose, 1990; Rose
and Miller, 1992). Therefore, the central question of governmentality is
by what means are governments able to instill control and predictable
conduct in society (or, pertaining to this paper, foster sustainable
conduct)? Part of the answer is to alter the subjectivities of actors,
which means to give the governing subjects motivation to self-regulate.
Motivation arises from having received the responsibility to comply,
and the threat of sanctions if not. The focus of compliance is a deﬁned
and recognised object: a governable object. Such an object must be
rendered knowable, not merely as an object in itself, but as an object
'that can be governed through decentered, self-regulating means'
(Rydin, 2007:611).
The construction of governable objects, as ‘concrete devices for
managing and directing reality’ (MacKinnon, 2000:296) can be quite
varied, but often involve techniques of counting and calculation. In the
realm of aquaculture, the louse can be seen as a representative of
human impact on nature, and in order to perform associated inspections
and control compliance, authorities need an indicator that is easily
measurable. Given that the louse is visible and countable, it is an ex-
cellent candidate. As Miller (2001) eloquently argues, what is counted
usually counts, which may help to explain the overwhelming focus on
the salmon louse and the considerable eﬀorts made by the industry to
control infestations. To govern by numbers means to apply the logic of
accountancy to the realm of public management, and thus the ability to
translate diverse and complex processes into a single ﬁgure. As stated in
the White Paper fortifying salmon louse as an indicator for regulating
aquaculture production in Norway: ‘In simplifying complicated condi-
tions, an indicator should provide a clear signal on the status or change
in status’ (Fiskeridepartementet, 2015).
Indicators like governmental technologies and governable objects
have multiple purposes and serve diﬀerent interests. Both within or-
ganisations and in regulation from public authorities, control is sought
by auditing a delimited number of parameters, usually quantitative
(Amundsen and Osmundsen, 2019). Although qualitative reports may
contain more information, they are vulnerable to suspicions of bias; in
contrast, measurements and numbers convey a reassuring ‘mechanical
objectivity’ and methodological transparency (Porter, 1996). Standar-
dised measures and indicators are mobile across contexts, facilitate
commensurability (Espeland and Stevens, 1998) and reduce transaction
costs in a global economy (Busch, 2000, 2011). When employed in
regulation, indicators must be standardised in order to create fair and
transparent competition (Almklov et al., 2014). Indicators may serve to
bridge knowledge gaps and help construct a web of commonly shared
norms, conventions, and rules across diﬀerent policy arenas (Guston,
1999; Jasanoﬀ, 1987) thus creating consensus between actors regarding
their usability. However, more often than not resistance exists towards
such processes (Rydin, 2007). Indeed, Strassheim and Kettunen
(2014:260) highlight how the construction of a governable object
constitutes a result of ‘an intensive and complex struggle for political
and epistemic authority on both sides: science as well as policy’.
2 A search in Norwegian media archives (Atekst) revealed that salmon lice
was mentioned in three media pieces in 1986, 186 pieces in 2006 and 4,494
pieces in 2015.
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The creation of governmental technologies additionally rests on
mechanisms of exclusion and selectivity, here most notably modes of
blackboxing (Callon, 1986; Latour, 1999) and over-simpliﬁcation
(Scott, 1998). Blackboxing is a social process where complexities are
rendered invisible and obscure to give way for the production of ob-
jectivity. As Porter (1996:27) explains, black boxes are artiﬁcial entities
that are treated as units; what we see is the input and output, whereas the
inside remains agreed and accepted pieces of knowledge that are rarely
examined. In turn, over-simpliﬁcation pertains to the narrowing of vi-
sion, thereby bringing into focus certain limited aspects of an otherwise
complex reality. The aspect in focus is thus rendered legible and makes
the phenomenon more susceptible to measurement and calculation
(Scott, 1998). However, this also entails that certain issues are priori-
tised over others.
2. Materials and methods
2.1. Empirical setting
Governmental control with the aquaculture industry was earlier
based on control with production volumes, ﬁrst with feed quotas, next
by delimiting the production permitted in volumes, and today through
Maximum Allowed Biomass (MAB) (Hersoug and Hovland, 2014;
Hersoug et al., 2019). Environmental concerns have continuously been
emphasised in regulation, but primarily through control with opera-
tions.
The salmon louse existed long before ﬁsh farming was introduced,
and was known to cause wounds and discomfort in wild salmon.
However, as salmon aquaculture production increased in terms of vo-
lume, salmon lice infestations increased too. This represents a problem
for both farmed and wild salmon, but the main aim of specifying and
regulating lice on farmed salmon is to protect wild salmonids. Fewer
lice in aquaculture pens result in lower infection pressure on passing
wild salmonids.
The concentration of lice in aquaculture facilities has been shown to
aﬀect and infest passing wild salmon and trout, but there is disagree-
ment regarding the strength of the correlation between lice levels in
aquaculture pens and the mortality of wild salmonids. Karlsen et al.
(2016) have summarised the knowledge gaps concerning the relation-
ship between salmon lice and wild salmonids, concluding that knowl-
edge is medium or bad for a number of key issues pertinent to applying
salmon lice as an indicator for regulation. Even though Thorstad and
Finstad (2018) subsequently demonstrated that salmon lice are very
likely to have a population eﬀect on wild salmonids, disagreements and
uncertainties have led to protests against the role of salmon lice as a
governmental technology.3
In 2009, the Salmon Lice Directive was passed in order to regulate
the infestation levels of lice in aquaculture pens in Norway. The di-
rective speciﬁes how salmon lice should be counted, how treatments
against lice should be conducted, and the authority of the Food Safety
Authority in controlling and sanctioning breeches. It further speciﬁes
how counts should be undertaken and when, on which pens, and how
many ﬁsh.4 The Food Safety Authority can reduce production on sites
that display long-term problems with lice. Accordingly, since 2015, 41
sites have been instructed to reduce production. Since 2009, the di-
rective has been modiﬁed several times, in particular towards speci-
fying an increasingly strict number of lice permitted. Salmon lice issues
prevented the authorities from issuing ordinary aquaculture licences
between 2009 and 2013, despite the government’s signiﬁcant ambitions
for growth in the aquaculture industry. In 2013, so-called green li-
cences5 were issued with special requirements calling for stricter con-
trol against salmon lice and escapees, and introducing a stricter limit for
lice (0.25 level and 0.1 level). With the announcement of development
licences in 2015, the salmon louse was once again made the centre of
attention. These licences promote technological innovations that could
combat lice and escapees. Companies with these special purpose li-
cences can later transform them into a regular licence in exchange for a
ﬁxed price.
In 2014, the White Paper to the Storting (Fiskeridepartementet,
2015) proposed new means of regulating growth in the aquaculture
industry, again based on lice numbers as an indicator. The Directorate
of Fisheries, which has the authority to grant permits and MAB, was
now to rely on lice numbers and modelled eﬀects on wild salmon in
order to regulate production volumes in the Norwegian salmon in-
dustry. In the new system, where the production sites across Norway
are divided into 13 production areas, lice numbers are the sole in-
dicator6 to permit or deny production growth, measured in MAB af-
fecting all sites in the same production area. Each area receives a green,
yellow or red light towards production growth based on an estimate of
‘salmon lice induced mortality on wild ﬁsh’. Companies can be oﬀered
an increase in MAB if their area receives a green light, or as an ex-
ception, individual sites with extremely low lice numbers may also be
oﬀered an increase. In sum, the speciﬁc lice levels applicable to sites
and companies vary extensively (across geographical areas, types of
licences, and seasonal variations) and constitute a complicated system
to regulate and control.
2.2. Materials
The material for this article is a document analysis of responses to
the consultation round for the White Paper (Fiskeridepartementet,
2015) proposing a new system for regulating growth in the salmon
farming industry in Norway, an interview study with industry re-
presentatives, scientists and governmental agencies, and available
public material (White Papers, oﬃcial statistics, and policy papers).
The analysis of responses to the consultation round on the White
Paper includes 56 responses from diﬀerent stakeholder groups. Of
these, 20 came from industry actors (both aquaculture and other in-
dustries), 15 from non-governmental organisations (NGOs), nine from
governmental agencies, eight from municipalities and counties, and
four from research institutes. With the aim of discussing the develop-
ment of the salmon louse as a governable technology, as well as the
disagreement and resistance that exists regarding this development, the
responses were read and categorised. Statements regarding salmon
louse as an indicator and suggestions for other indicators were noted.
3 See for instance - http://ilaks.no/risikabelt-lakse-eksperiment/ [in
Norwegian]
4 According to the Salmon Lice Directive, §6, lice are to be counted at least
every seventh day with temperatures equivalent to or above 4°C, and at least
every fourteenth day with temperatures below 4°C. At any time, there should be
fewer than 0.5 grown females on average per ﬁsh in an aquaculture facility
(§8). When a facility has more than three pens, the lice from a selection of ﬁsh
from at least half of the pens should be counted each time, so that all pens are
included in two consecutive counts. If the facility has three pens or fewer, lice
on a selection from all pens should be counted each time. From 1 June to 31
January, counts should be conducted on 10 randomly selected ﬁsh, and from 1
February to 31 May on 20 ﬁsh. Lice should be counted and categorised in three
(footnote continued)
stages: female adult, pre-adult and chalimus. The average number is calculated
based on the number in each stage from all ﬁsh examined, divided by the total
number of ﬁsh examined.
5 So-called ‘green licences’ are permits announced by the Norwegian gov-
ernment in 2013, with conditions promoting a higher environmental standard
than before, e.g. limiting the threshold for lice numbers and medical treat-
ments.
6 To be more precise, the modelled mortality of wild salmonids based on
numbers of lice in aquaculture facilities and local dispersion patterns. For
further information: http://www.imr.no/lakseluskart/html/lakseluskart.html
In the White Paper, it was foreseen that louse as an indicator would be cou-
pled with other indicators, but this has yet to occur.
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Other statements concerning the consequences of using the salmon
louse as an indicator were also recorded, especially pertaining to the
consequences for the regulatory system and expressed uncertainties
linked to the indicator itself.
The material also consists of qualitative interviews with industry
and public administrators in Norway, where the scope was the potential
to improve existing regulatory mechanisms and systems. This includes
53 interviews, each lasting approximately one and a half to two hours.
These comprise interviews with 25 aquaculture companies (22 ﬁsh
farms and three service companies or veterinaries) and 28 re-
presentatives from public authorities: (Food Safety Authorities,
Directorate of Fisheries, County Governor (Climate and Environmental
Department) and Counties and Municipalities. The starting point of the
interviews was to study public aquaculture regulation aimed at sus-
tainable growth, in light of current policy strategies, day-to-day reg-
ulation, and the increased focus on sustainability issues. Semi-struc-
tured interview guides were prepared to ensure that all relevant topics
were covered, while at the same time allowing for follow-up questions
on topics raised by the informants. The interview guides were prepared
for each group of respondents allowing for questions adapted to each
while maintaining comparability in types of questions and topics. After
a short introduction about the background of the respondent, the in-
terviews’ main topics concerned the respondents’ experience and per-
ception of public regulation of the aquaculture industry, availability of
up-to-date knowledge and information, collaboration and dialogue
between public regulators and industry, and ﬁnally the main challenges
facing the industry and the extent of sustainability of aquaculture
production. All of the interviews were recorded, transcribed, and
anonymised.
The transcribed interviews have been re-read for the purpose of this
article, and the transcripts coded in categories identifying statements
regarding the role of salmon lice in public regulation, regulatory fra-
meworks and praxis, and impact and eﬀect of regulation. The coded
transcripts were compared across respondent groups (public authorities
and industry), and within each group, to identify similarities and dif-
ferences between respondents. To explore the salmon louse as a gov-
ernmental technology and the resistance towards it, the results pre-
sented in this article focus on the discourse of regulation and
sustainability in the aquaculture industry, especially regarding how our
respondents frame lice, and the role of lice in characterising challenges
in aquaculture. Furthermore, we also present the respondents’ under-
standings and perceptions of the salmon louse as an indicator for sus-
tainability.
3. Results
Below we report on ﬁndings from our material highlighting the
characteristics of the salmon louse being established as a governmental
technology, as well as resistance to this process.
3.1. Expanding governmental control: establishing a proxy for
environmental impact
Historically, salmon lice have not always been viewed as a problem,
as a statement from one of the respondents from the aquaculture in-
dustry reveals:
“Catching wild salmon in Norwegian rivers with salmon lice was once
considered a sign of quality and freshness. If the wild salmon had lice
when caught, it was viewed as a strong individual that had travelled up
the river so fast that the lice had not had time to be washed oﬀ”
(Industry, 101).
However, considering the scale of salmon production today, the
salmon louse is viewed as a severe environmental problem. This is also
reﬂected in the responses to the White Paper, most of which express a
need and willingness to develop improved environmental control, as
well as agreement that the salmon louse constitutes a good indicator of
the environmental impact from salmon production. However, several
responses underline the fact that self-reported lice numbers by the in-
dustry might not be trustworthy and that applying lice as the sole in-
dicator is too narrow an approach. Moreover, some responses express
disagreement with the relevance of the salmon louse as a proxy for
environmental impact. For instance, the Norwegian Seafood
Federation, which represents 600 companies in the seafood industry,
argues against using salmon louse as a proxy for environmental impact,
holding that the scientiﬁc foundation for asserting that there is a strong
correlation between mortality in emigrating wild salmon and infesta-
tion levels of lice in aquaculture facilities has not been proven. On the
other hand, they do support the use of lice for controlling growth in the
industry, as this may induce increased motivation to control infestation
levels and have a positive impact on animal welfare.
The following quotation from an aquaculture company summarises
the disagreements:
“And the regulations, they are based on knowledge that we see as in-
suﬃcient. It is the interaction between aquaculture and wild ﬁsh that is
the reason we handle it the way we do. Just last year the Norwegian
Institute for Nature Research stated, on our commission, that the
knowledge we have today about the interaction between wild ﬁsh and
aquaculture is not good enough. There are big knowledge gaps that need
to be ﬁlled, and we probably have more such areas. If you ask someone
who is an expert on handling parasites the answer will be that the regime
we have today is completely wrong” (Industry, 102).
This respondent echoes the concern voiced by both respondents in
interviews and responses to the White Paper: the salmon louse is im-
portant in assessing environmental impact, but provides only part of the
full picture, and several knowledge gaps remain.
3.2. Moving towards self- regulation and sanctions
Establishing the louse as a governmental technology means to in-
corporate the indicator as part of public authorities’ mandate to sanc-
tion non-compliance, and to motivate industrial players to comply.
In the responses to the White Paper, concern for how the salmon
louse is to be incorporated into the existing mandates of the various
public authorities responsible for regulating aquaculture is voiced. The
Directorate of Fisheries and the Food Safety Authority both claim that
the new production area regime based on louse as an indicator will be
complex and diﬃcult to administer, and that responsibilities between
the various agencies might be obscured. One of the industrial actors
echoes these concerns, arguing that the proposed changes may disrupt
the former division between industrial policy as a political domain and
environmental or biological expertise. Several of the industrial actors
recommend that awarding licences and production growth should
continue to be based on price alone, and that lice and other environ-
mental issues should be regulated through inspections (and sanctions)
of day-to-day operations. In an interview, a respondent from the Food
Safety Authority expressed concern about the unilateral focus on lice. In
the new production area system, the louse is the sole indicator for
growth, yet indicators for the health and welfare of farmed salmon are
neglected.
The handling of the lice problem is also relevant for the County
Governors, who are responsible for issuing discharge permits in the
diﬀerent counties. County Governors are increasingly concerned about
discharge from delousing medication, but also consider the sharing of
responsibilities across diﬀerent public authorities a diﬃcult task. As
stated by one respondent:
“It's a bit strange that there are two public authorities that deal with
pollution. The Food Safety Authority gives permission for the use of en-
vironmentally harmful substances and discharge, meaning delousing
medication, without involvement from us [County Governor]. In our
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legal framework there are few contradictions. They work with lice and
delousing medication hoping that a better handling of it will come, be-
cause veterinary authorities evaluate disease, but perhaps they haven't
considered the eﬀects outside of the pen” (Public agency, 202).
The responses also reﬂect disagreement as to the sanctioning of non-
compliance, and argue against establishing production areas based on
collective sanctions, i.e. all producers in one area may risk reduced
MAB if one producer fails to comply. What is referred to as collective
sanctions in a production area receives considerable attention from the
industrial actors in their responses to the White Paper, as well as from
some of the counties. Indeed, a respondent from an aquaculture com-
pany states:
“The traﬃc light system is collective punishment; a whole area can get
reduced biomass because of one producer who does not follow the reg-
ulations, and who doesn’t have control with his production. The in-
dividual companies should have to reduce their production. That is what
they do now. And that is the right way to do it” (Industry, 103).
A few of the public agencies also voice their disagreements with the
collective sanction. For instance, one county argues that the Food Safety
Authority already has the mandate to reduce biomass at a site level, and
warns against a production area system based on collective sanctions.
3.3. Rendering the louse knowable and governable
Science has provided knowledge that has rendered the salmon louse
knowable, and enabled the transformation of the salmon louse into an
indicator that ﬁsh farmers can count and authorities can control and
measure. During the past 10 years, knowledge about the salmon louse
has increased, and models and tools to enable decision support and
statistical overviews have been developed.
On the other hand, several of our respondents question the scientiﬁc
foundation and the conclusion that has been drawn. As one of the re-
spondents from an aquaculture company states:
“The current lice situation… I am very uncertain of both the lice situation
and the escaped farmed ﬁsh in the rivers. It has never been discussed. It
has just been concluded that both have an impact on the wild stock. But
all experiments show that perhaps it does not have such a large impact on
the stocks. So, we have the Norwegian Food Safety Authority… and the
authorities just implemented lice and escapes as absolute things. Because
of… something I don't… I feel this discussion has never been open, in a
way. It has just… The conclusions have just been made” (Industry,
105).
Respondents from public agencies also acknowledge the importance
of more knowledge about the issue. As stated by a public administrator:
"There is a need for more information regarding lice because the media and
society in general focuses more on it" (Public agency, 202). Even though
the louse is at centre stage in the regulation of aquaculture, more
knowledge is required.
Some ﬁsh farmers claim that the amounts of lice currently in
Norwegian ﬁsh farms are the same as 30 years ago. Some also argue
that they scarcely experience lice on their ﬁsh, because the prevalence
of infestations varies geographically. As stated by one respondent:
“We do not have an animal welfare issue with salmon lice in Norway.
Perhaps some areas have it from time to time. But we have zero, we
almost never have any lice on our ﬁsh. So, we are using up the active
medication available on something we do not know why we are doing. It
might be that we are doing the right thing, but I don't think we are quite
sure" (Industry, 101).
The respondent highlights how geographical variation is ignored
when the coordinated use of delousing medication is enforced in areas
with several ﬁsh farms. Another respondent claims:
"When you look at the industry, you have a lice crisis in Trøndelag […].
But the whole industry is viewed as having a lice crisis. Last time we had
a challenge [of lice] in this region was in 2009. That was seven years
ago. And still… you are treated as if you have a crisis" (Industry, 104).
There is disagreement among our respondents as to whether or not
the Norwegian salmon industry as a whole is experiencing augmented
numbers of lice, and there is also disagreement within the industry as to
the signiﬁcance of the problem and how it should be combated.
This debate is echoed in responses to the White Paper: claims are
made that the proposed salmon louse indicator is both too weak and too
strict, and the disagreements range from how robust it is to what it
actually represents. This concerns how the number of lice comes to be,
and what level of lice numbers should lead to measures by the farmer or
public agencies. Responses also highlight a concern that reducing the
number of lice permissible will lead to more delousing operations, thus
causing stress, high mortality, reduced growth, and a weakened im-
mune system in salmon. Delousing operations may also represent a risk
for the personnel and cause damage to net pens (hence causing es-
capes). The respondents therefore claim that there is a high cost, both
for the ﬁsh and for the staﬀ, of reducing lice infestations. Several re-
sponses (such as by research institutes) call for indicators to measure
the use of medication, with the purpose of motivating the industry to
apply non-medical methods against salmon lice. Most responses from
the industry acknowledge the importance of using the salmon louse as
an indicator, but additionally question the scientiﬁc foundation for
concluding that salmon lice have a population eﬀect on wild salmonids.
Several of the NGOs’ responses to the White Paper also emphasise the
need to improve the scientiﬁc foundation for applying the salmon louse
as an indicator and seek additional indicators. Moreover, some of the
environmental NGOs conclude that compliance with the indicator
should not lead to increased biomass.
One of the research institutes responsible for developing the dis-
tribution model for salmon louse, the Institute for Marine Research,
acknowledges the need for more knowledge and warns against the
threshold value suggested by the White Paper, but concurs with the use
of the salmon louse as an indicator.
3.4. Translating salmon counts into routinised modes of action
Since 2009, counting salmon lice has constituted a routine aspect of
operating a ﬁsh farm, and as the permissible level of lice has dimin-
ished, the number of delousing operations has increased. Several of the
responses to the White Paper question how, by whom, and where (i.e.
in a pen, on a site, or in a production area) lice should be counted. An
issue that is frequently raised pertains to whether counting by the
producers themselves can be reliable, as the potential exists to game the
system. Both responses to the White Paper and interviews reveal con-
cerns about the dilemmas involved in handling the farmed ﬁsh at in-
creasingly lower levels of lice.
Additional delousing operations have unintentional consequences,
including the augmented transportation of ﬁsh increasing the possibi-
lity of transmitting diseases and reducing ﬁsh welfare. As a respondent
from the Directorate of Fisheries explains: “There are some who think that
one has been too strict on regulating lice levels, and that it has brought more
problems than solutions” (Public agency, 203). Certain dilemmas are
involved, as combating lice with delousing medication is understood to
aﬀect the marine environment, especially crustaceans. Moreover, phy-
sical handling of the farmed salmon when delousing is harmful and
stressful, and being reared into well boats for delousing causes wounds
that may weaken their immune system. As the following statement from
a respondent at the Directorate of Fisheries concerned with ﬁsh welfare
illustrates:
“If you have two million ﬁsh at one ﬁsh farm, and you have a loss of 20
per cent, or you have a mortality of 20 per cent, 400,000 ﬁsh disappear.
It is not a pretty picture. There is something about natural mortality rate
in ﬁsh that you can't put 1,000 ﬁsh in the ocean and expect that 1,000
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ﬁsh will make it no matter how well you treat them, really. But 20 per
cent and more, that's not good. No, the ﬁsh are handled a lot more. They
are handled too much. In and out of well boats, lice treatments and
stressing, perhaps moving” (Public agency, 204).
Furthermore, respondents from the county administration are
sceptical of the emphasis on lice, especially in the media:
“An optimal environment is the safest way to avoid disease. Stress causes
disease. Delousing on low occurrences of lice also causes stress, especially
if you use hydrogen peroxide and need to delouse in a well boat. We have
received comments from the veterinary inspector that this is not justiﬁ-
able for animal health. But society has made some conditions here… The
media and society in general do not have professional insight into this…
but there is no room for discussion. You do not get your message across
and few dare to try” (Public Agency, 205).
In the same vein, a respondent from the industry explains the con-
sequences of the regulations: “What we are in the middle of now – a lice
discussion – the way the regulations demand that we handle lice in situations
in periods where there is a big risk related to mortality for example, is not
sustainable" (Industry, 102). The potential eﬀects of combating lice
(whether via medication or technology) on the environment, wild sal-
monids, and farmed ﬁsh constitute the centre of attention for many of
the stakeholders’ discussions, especially those in the industry.
3.5. Standardising louse counts across time and space and disciplining
through naming and shaming
While louse counts have been routine operations on salmon farms
since 2009, it was through the publication of a so-called “lice list” that
the public authorities (Food Safety Authority) in 2015 increased the
pressure to comply. Lice counts from individual farms along the coast
were thus compared and publicly announced three times a year, naming
and shaming those who had exceeded the permitted numbers of lice for
a longer period of time and who had been given a warning or decision
to reduce biomass. Standardising louse counts across time and space,
and naming and shaming those who do not comply is viewed as a way
to “discipline” the industry into compliance, as explained by a re-
spondent from the Food Safety Authority: “It works like self-discipline,
because it is not OK to end up on that list, with poorer results than your
neighbour. We will not see any improvement unless somebody feels that it is
a bit uncomfortable” (Public agency, 320).
However, the industry perceives the publication of the lice list as
unnecessary and claims that it will have negative consequences for
public opinion:
“Many politicians still believe that the industry has a problem with lice
because we are unwilling, and if the industry is willing to put enough
money into the machine we will remove all lice. […] This is a total lack
of knowledge. And of course, this [perception] does not improve when
researchers claim they have the solution. We face the same challenge
with the vendors saying “we can kill the lice. We have the solution”. All
of this information from actors around the industry, with their own
agendas, contributes to this misconception of the situation” (Industry,
305).
The standardisation of lice numbers across time and space, and the
publication of lice numbers are not considered in the White Paper, and
few of the responses thus reveal perspectives on the matter.
Nevertheless, a couple of responses indicate how the causes of in-
festations may be external to the farm. One of the producers argues that
companies with large sites will inﬂuence the level of lice in a produc-
tion area more than companies with smaller sites, due to their greater
biomass. The response points to the fact that although counts are
conducted in individual pens and farms, the causes of infestations may
actually be neighbouring farms and currents. Standardising counts
across time and space is thus deemed problematic.
4. Discussion
The results of this article illustrate resistance and disagreement re-
garding the establishment of the salmon louse as a governmental
technology in Norwegian aquaculture. To become a governmental
technology, the louse needs to be rendered knowable, an object that can
be governed through decentred self-regulating means (Rose and Miller,
1992). This necessitates consensus regarding what the louse represents
– a threat to wild salmonids – and reliance on the counts made by ﬁsh
farmers. Through the White Paper, the government suggested boosting
the industry’s motivation to reduce lice infestations by linking low le-
vels to promises of increased growth in production, and the threat of
sanctions (such as reduced biomass) where the industry fails to comply.
While the results demonstrate that most stakeholders consider the
salmon louse important in assessing environmental impact, there is
widespread concern that the indicator is only partial and that knowl-
edge gaps need to be ﬁlled. Industrial actors and public authorities also
argue against the introduction of collective sanctions, as well as against
obscuring divisions between diﬀerent public authorities and their re-
spective mandates. The ﬁndings show that there are disagreements
regarding the degree of impact on wild salmonids, whether the lice
infestations are equally problematic at all sites and geographical areas,
and the robustness of the indicator. Another characteristic of the
salmon louse as a governmental technology is to translate lice counts
into routinised modes of action (Hersoug, 2015; Rose and Miller, 1992).
Industrial actors and public authorities, among others, voice concern
over the dilemmas involved in treating salmon at low levels of lice
infestations, which they perceive as undermining ﬁsh welfare (and even
causing mortality), encourage gaming the system through reporting
lower levels of lice than is the case, and increased escapes due to a
higher frequency on operations.
The ﬁnal characteristic of establishing a governmental technology is
to standardise louse counts across time and space, and to encourage
self-discipline through naming and shaming (Rydin, 2007). The stan-
dardised lice counts and publicly available indicator trends have a clear
normative directionality that stimulate improved performance, and
encourage self-discipline. The ‘naming and shaming’ of the industry
through publicly available lice data seeks to inﬂuence behaviour and
enables comparisons to be made across time and space. There are di-
vergent opinions as to the consequences of publishing the names of the
sites that exceed lice numbers, and a few of the responses to the White
Paper voice disagreement regarding the standardisation of lice counts.
The salmon louse as a governmental technology apparently lacks
the capacity to create consensus among stakeholders. The political ca-
reer of the louse has persisted despite disagreement and resistance from
various stakeholders. Strassheim and Kettunen (2014) describe a si-
milar trajectory when investigating the scientiﬁc approval of facts
through intensive and complex struggles for epistemic authority. They
ﬁnd that this especially applies to circumstances where it is diﬃcult to
validate knowledge, akin to the situation in aquaculture (Osmundsen
et al., 2017).
The results demonstrate resistance to the political career of the
salmon louse as a governmental technology. The process is char-
acterised by disagreements between those who emphasise that knowl-
edge gaps and uncertainties must be ﬁlled before reﬁning the system,
and those who hold that the knowledge is suﬃcient and will be im-
proved by installing the system. As such, the application of the louse as
a governmental technology can be seen as part of an intention to im-
prove the regulatory framework and a means to attain knowledge.
4.1. The implications
There are at least four implications of the salmon louse as a gov-
ernmental technology. First, in order to become an indicator, dis-
agreements and uncertainties must be concealed through processes of
blackboxing (Callon, 1986; Latour, 1999; Porter, 1996). All the
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reservations, guesswork, judgments, decisions, uncertainties, and in-
consistencies that enabled the salmon louse to become an indicator of
environmental impact are obscured; hence the number is portrayed as
neutral and objective. Indeed, public authorities and others present and
discuss numbers of lice as a neutral fact and provide a skewed im-
pression to the public of what the indicator represents. Certainly, an
impression is created that lice counts represent routine operations that
are not susceptible to creative gaming or bias. An impression is also
made that even though medical treatments against lice should be lim-
ited, other measures such as cleaner ﬁsh and technological solutions are
readily available. Such measures have negative consequences for ﬁsh
welfare, causing stress and mortality (Holen et al., 2018), also for the
cleaner ﬁsh (e.g. lumpsuckers), and are not as eﬀective and available as
one would think. Thus, our respondents have revealed the disagree-
ments and uncertainties that the salmon louse as a governmental
technology entail.
Second, blackboxing serves to position responsibilities and power.
The aquaculture industry bears much of the responsibility for severe
lice numbers, but the predominance of the salmon louse as an indicator
also conceals numerous complex relationships between cause and ef-
fect. When these are obscured, the industry additionally holds respon-
sibility for conditions and circumstances beyond their control and in-
ﬂuence, even though these are better managed through a combination
of private and public regulation (Osmundsen et al., 2017). Furthermore,
controlling lice has become a collective responsibility, as augmented
lice numbers in production areas include several ﬁsh farms that are
measured and sanctioned. Establishing the louse as a governmental
technology aﬀords power to some and responsibilities to others. Given
that the salmon louse represents accepted/unaccepted environmental
impact, the Directorate of Fisheries now has the power to reduce MAB
in production areas where lice numbers are too high. In contrast, such a
sanction was only available to the Food Safety Authority at the site-
level in the past.
An indicator by its nature constitutes a simpliﬁed representation of
reality (Kongsvik et al., 2010). Indeed, although the salmon louse has
become a star with tremendous power in the regulation of aquaculture,
it can only say something about a tiny piece of a complex reality. The
third implication of relying too much on one indicator is that the focus
on the louse becomes so narrow that other issues are placed outside of
focus. Both industry and regulators spend considerable time and eﬀort
counting and controlling lice, whereas important issues such as diseases
and other parasites receive less attention. Furthermore, by placing such
an emphasis on local externalities of aquaculture production, important
broader scale impacts of the industry are, to a large degree, not ad-
dressed (Amundsen et al., 2019).
The fourth and ﬁnal implication is that the importance of control-
ling the louse is so paramount to the industry that all energy is ex-
pended in this task. This includes most technological, biological, and
managerial innovations and investments that are currently made, re-
sulting in less eﬀort applied to other issues. The aquaculture industry
views the louse as a threat to its environmental credibility and re-
putation (Vilde Steiro Amundsen et al., 2019). It is therefore important
for the industry that they are seen to take the problem seriously, fol-
lowing regulations and implementing measures to combat salmon lice,
in spite of the negative consequences of such eﬀorts. Negative and
unintended consequences can be increased transportation of ﬁsh aug-
menting the transmission of diseases and reducing ﬁsh welfare, the use
(and subsequent death) of cleaner ﬁsh, and the stress and deterioration
of welfare among salmon due to treatment.
The White Paper also discusses the use of other indicators, and
while the responses are mixed, the conclusion was that other indicators
must wait until more knowledge has been attained. Several issues be-
sides lice may well become candidates for governable objects and in-
dicators for sustainability, including mortality rates and losses, use of
medication, escape of ﬁsh, discharge, parasites and viruses, ﬁsh beha-
viour (e.g. welfare and stress), and ﬁsh growth (i.e. food intake).
Indicators that represent these issues are being used to guide manage-
ment strategies and to report on environmental impacts, but they have
not become governable objects to the same extent as the salmon louse.
Based on the argument presented in this paper, this may be because
none are precise enough or as easily countable. However, in the future,
such indicators may also be included as governmental technology in the
same manner.
4.2. Concluding remarks
In the salmon farming industry in Norway, the salmon louse has
been called upon to encourage responsible rearing of salmon, to im-
prove decision-making, to reduce environmental impacts, and ulti-
mately, if combated, to promote production growth in the industry. In
spite of resistance and an intense struggle for political and epistemic
authority, the salmon louse has persevered as an indicator, and today
permeates the Norwegian regulation of aquaculture. As a protagonist in
the public administration of aquaculture, the salmon louse represents
the environmental consequences of salmon production: it protects the
wild salmon, serves as a yardstick for public regulators, and enables the
industry to demonstrate accountability. The louse is thus plastic enough
to serve as a common reference for seemingly contradictory positions
regarding aquaculture, despite the lack of consensus. A question that
only time will answer is whether this should be seen as governmental
craftsmanship, allowing for control from a distance, or simply a failure
to create consensus among the numerous stakeholders concerned with
the role of aquaculture production.
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